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In this article, we investigate how the emergence of an ownership structure with multiple large
shareholders (MLS) affects principal-agent as well as principal-principal conflicts of interests in
Chinese listed firms having the government as controlling shareholder. Thereby, we account for
the source of MLS entry by distinguishing between a non-state investor buying shares when the
government divests vs. retains its ownership stake. We find that MLS entry alleviates principal-
agent problems, as evidenced by a lower managerial perk consumption and a higher pay-for-
performance sensitivity of managerial compensation, as well as principal-principal problems, as
reflected by a smaller ratio of related-party transactions and a lower labor redundancy.
Interestingly, and except for the reduction in excess personnel, we find that the above effects
arise only when the newly entered non-state investor accumulated a stake without corresponding
government divestment. In contrast, the curtailing effect of MLS entry on labor redundancy only
occurs when the government was willing to give up a non-trivial part of its ownership. In line
with the above findings, we show that MLS entry significantly enhances the firm's stock market
valuation, with this effect predominantly arising from the anticipated reduction in excess per-
sonnel.
1. Introduction
Corporate governance research, starting with Berle and Means (1932) and further developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), among others, initially focused on the incentive problems between managers and shareholders in listed
firms, i.e. the principal-agent (PA) conflict of interests. In an Anglo-American setting, listed firms are indeed often widely held by
many investors who have neither the incentives nor the ability to monitor the firm's top management. Later, a new generation of work
led by Dharwadkar et al. (2000), La Porta et al. (1999), and Young et al. (2008) identified another major agency problem, that
between large and small shareholders, i.e. the principal- principal (PP) conflict of interests. In non-Anglo-American countries, listed
firms tend to have concentrated ownership structures and controlling shareholders may abuse their power by engaging in tunneling
activities, to the detriment of the firm's minority investors. As a corporate governance (CG) solution to this PP conflict, recent
research has focused on the role of another large shareholder (see, e.g., Attig et al., 2013; Boateng and Huang, 2017; Boubaker and
Sami, 2011; Cheng et al., 2017; Jiang et al., 2018; Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Mishra, 2011). As compared with an ownership structure
that includes only one large shareholder, an ownership structure with multiple large shareholders (MLS hereafter) might be able to
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curtail any self-serving behavior by the firm's dominant owner.
From an empirical perspective, a number of studies have confirmed this governance role of MLS in mitigating the PP agency
problem. As an example, relying on a large sample of listed firms in 22 East Asian and Western European countries, Attig et al. (2013)
find a positive relation between the presence of MLS and the value of excess cash holdings, from which they infer that other large
shareholders are able to discipline the firm's controlling shareholder. Moreover, this effect is more pronounced when the largest
shareholder's control is under higher contestability and when voting rights are more evenly held among MLS. Boubaker and Sami
(2011) show that such control contestability also enhances the informativeness of a firm's earnings, indicating reduced information
asymmetries. Next, Mishra (2011) demonstrates that the presence of MLS effectively limits the power of the firm's dominant owner to
pursue a conservative investment strategy and thus positively affects corporate risk taking. Jiang et al. (2018) also find that the
countervailing forces of other large shareholders enhance corporate investment efficiency. Finally, Boateng and Huang (2017) show
that the presence of MLS reduces the magnitude of intercompany loans in firms with a major shareholder.
Our paper extends this stream of research by exploring the corporate governance role of MLS in Chinese state-controlled listed
firms (SOEs), which exhibit a mixture of PA as well as PP agency problems. The state, although a large shareholder and thus having
the necessary incentives, may not be able to curb PA problems (e.g., Qian, 1996; Qiang, 2003). In line with the literature, we argue
that state ownership could aggravate the PA conflict of interests in listed SOEs due to the government's pursuit of non-value-
maximizing goals and inadequate managerial monitoring. First, the government could rely on its listed SOEs to realize various other,
i.e. social or political objectives. Then, the focus of the firm's controlling shareholder will be diverted away from value maximization.
In such an environment, managers likely find it easier to chase other objectives, including their own. Moreover, evidence shows that
loss-making SOEs continue to be supported (subsidized) by the state, which further weakens executive incentives to enhance firm
efficiency and value (e.g., Chen et al., 2008). Next, the fact that multiple government agencies often have authority over a listed SOE
tends to further diminish the effectiveness of managerial monitoring. Besides, the state representatives in the Board are not really
‘professionals’, who are specialized in executive monitoring. Since the extent to which the management is scrutinized is less than
optimal, those executives may find it relatively easy to pursue their own interests, to the detriment of all shareholders. As regards the
PP conflict of interests, the large stake typically held by the state in Chinese listed SOEs enables the government to expropriate
minority investors in many different ways, possibly to realize some social or political goals. Compared to privately controlled listed
firms, the PP problem in listed SOEs may thus take a specific form. While minority investors in the stock market could resort to public
and private enforcement, the protection of investor rights is only weak in China. First, public enforcement has been hampered by the
limited authority of security market regulators. What is more, market regulators are more inclined to enforce rules when a private
block holder engages in tunneling (e.g., Berkman et al., 2010). Finally, the Chinese legal system offers only few options for minority
investors to initiate private-enforcement actions against block holders (see also Jiang et al., 2010). The PP conflict of interests can
therefore not be ignored in Chinese listed SOEs.
To examine the multi-faceted corporate governance role of MLS, our study relies on a large sample of Chinese state-controlled
listed firms over the 2006–2017 period. To accurately capture the power of each firm's dominant owner, we view shareholders
related to the government as one group and add up their shareholdings (see also Jiang et al., 2018). To that end, we count the shares
held by the various levels of government, state agencies, as well as state-owned legal persons ultimately controlled by the govern-
ment. Next, to ensure that the newly entering non-state block holders can effectively play a checks-and-balances role, we impose that
the state should not control a majority of voting rights after MLS entry. For the same reason, we further impose that the stake held by
the newly entered private investors should remain above 5% in each of the three years after MLS entry. In this paper, we aim to
answer the following questions: What are the effects of MLS entry on the two above-identified types of agency problems, and what are
the corresponding real effects for the listed SOE's stock market value? We employ a panel data model and a difference-in-difference
(DID) model to examine those questions. The latter model is run for a propensity-score-matched (PSM) subsample, which ensures that
the treated firms and the non-treated benchmark firms are comparable on a number of observable covariates. Moreover, we highlight
the importance of the source of MLS entry. Specifically, for a listed SOE with MLS entry, we classify it into the subsample of firms in
which the government decided to reduce its stake to facilitate the formation of an MLS ownership structure if the corresponding
reduction in state ownership is larger than 5%. Conversely, if the government decided to hold on to its stake, we classify the firm into
the subsample of firms in which the new block holder just bought shares in the secondary market. Our empirical results reveal that
this source of MLS entry matters greatly. Indeed, if a new non-state investor accumulated a large block of shares without the
government divesting, MLS entry helps reduce managerial perk consumption and increase the pay-for-performance sensitivity of
managerial compensation. Those findings suggest an alleviation of the PA conflict after MLS entry. Next, this type of MLS entry also
curtails the magnitude of related-party transactions, which indicates a reduction in the PP conflict as well. In contrast, labor re-
dundancy is moderated by MLS entry only if the government was willing to relinquish a substantial fraction of its ownership. In line
with the above findings, we find that the first entry of a non-state block holder significantly enhances the market-to-book ratio of
Chinese listed SOEs. Nonetheless, this effect appears to be driven by the subsample of firms in which the government divested a major
part of its ownership. Moreover, we find that this increase in the market-to-book ratio of Chinese listed SOEs is significantly related to
the subsequent diminution in excess personnel. Arguably, the latter findings suggest that stock market investors in China worry most
about the costs of political control (labor redundancy) in listed SOEs and hence especially welcome the government's divestment
decision, as a forerunner for the cutback in redundant personnel.
Overall, our study contributes to the recent and growing literature on the CG effects of multiple large shareholders in the fol-
lowing ways. First, to the best of our knowledge, this research has only explored the role of MLS by adopting a single perspective
regarding agency problems, i.e. the PP conflict of interests, when examining the influence of MLS on the dividend payout ratio
(Faccio et al., 2001), the value of excess cash holdings (Attig et al., 2013; Lin et al., 2016), the informativeness of earnings (Boubaker
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and Sami, 2011), corporate risk taking (Mishra, 2011) and investment efficiency (Jiang et al., 2018), etc. Using the specific context of
Chinese listed SOEs, which exhibit a mixture of PA as well as PP problems, we point out a more extensive role for MLS, as other large
shareholders curb not only PP but also PA conflicts. So, we provide empirical support for a more comprehensive CG role of MLS than
presumed in the literature to date. Second, the specific setting of MLS in state-controlled listed firms has not yet been extensively
examined. Most prior research on MLS has indeed investigated family-controlled listed firms (see, e.g., Attig et al., 2009; Maury and
Pajuste, 2005; Mishra, 2011). As an exception, Lin et al. (2016) find that the presence of MLS increases the value of excess cash
holdings in Chinese listed firms having the government as largest shareholder and a non-state entity as second largest block holder
during 2004–2011. However, they do not link their findings to either the PA or the PP conflict of interests, while excess cash can be
wasted by either the firm's management or dominant owner. We therefore extend the analysis of MLS in listed SOEs by using a more
general framework, in which we incorporate their influence on the various types of agency problems as well as their interaction with
the government divestment decision. We thereby pay careful attention to our measurement of the test variables in order to isolate PA
and PP conflicts. As an example, we do not rely on the extensively used ratio of SG&A expenses to sales to capture the PA conflict (see,
e.g., Henry, 2010; Singh and Davidson, 2003). Though this variable has been employed a lot in prior research, we argue that it may
be affected by not only the management's discretionary spending but also the dominant owner's self-serving behavior. Finally, and in
contrast to the existing literature that has adopted mostly a static perspective by exploring the effects of MLS presence, we embrace a
more dynamic perspective by analyzing the changes in the firm's behavior and stock market value from before to after MLS entry.
When developing our empirical models, we also pay careful attention to the various endogeneity problems that may plague corporate
governance research.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we develop several hypotheses as to the effects of MLS entry on the various types of
agency problems in state-controlled listed firms as well as the firm's stock market value. We thereby also account for the source of
MLS entry. Section 3 describes our sample and presents the variable measurements. In Section 4, we present our methodology and
descriptive analysis. The multivariate regression results are reported and discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. Development of hypotheses
2.1. Multiple large shareholders vs. principal-agent and principal-principal conflicts of interests
Traditional agency theory has pinpointed the principal-agent conflict of interests in listed firms that are led by a professional
management but widely held by many investors, as the incentives of managers are not always aligned with those of the firm's
shareholders (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). However, in many countries around
the world, a large shareholder tends to dominate the ownership of listed firms. While this dominant owner has the incentives to
monitor the management, thereby curbing the PA conflict between managers and shareholders, another type of agency problems
could now arise, i.e. a conflict of interests between this controlling shareholder and the firm's minority investors (see, e.g., Claessens
et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 1999; Young et al., 2008).
In the case of China, many listed firms have the government as largest shareholder and hence exhibit severe PA as well as PP
agency problems. Indeed, even with substantial voting rights, the government's ability to curb the PA problem continues to be limited
due to the very nature of the firm. First, the government as controlling shareholder in Chinese listed SOEs may wish to pursue various
other, i.e. social or political objectives. For example, under the guiding ideology of development, listed SOEs may be required by the
state to invest in particular industries, even though those investments cannot realize a large-enough profit. In addition, listed SOEs
may be required to cross-subsidize other SOEs, particularly those in financial distress, by buying at too high prices or selling at too
low prices. This aspect of state-controlled listed firms diverts the focus of the controlling shareholder (i.e. the government, who is
represented by bureaucrats and politicians in the management and in the Board) away from firm-value maximization, in order to
achieve those other objectives. Moreover, evidence shows that loss-making SOEs continue to be supported (subsidized) by the
government, which also makes it less urgent for the management in those firms to focus on firm efficiency and value (see Chen et al.,
2008). In an environment in which the corporate goal is not clearly set, managers likely find it easier to pursue other objectives,
including their own. Second, managerial monitoring in listed SOEs often is inadequate. The state representatives in the Board cannot
personally benefit from any increase in firm value engendered by their monitoring, which tends to diminish their efforts. Moreover,
those state representatives are not really ‘professionals’, who are specialized in executive monitoring on behalf of the firm's share-
holders and other stakeholders. In line with this latter argument, Qiang (2003) shows that the remuneration and promotion of SOE
managers depend heavily on the assessment by their superiors in the political and administrative hierarchy, who consider other
achievements than value maximization when making remuneration and promotion decisions (see also Chen and C, 2017; Firth et al.,
2007; Qian, 1996; Qian and Stiglitz, 1996). Moreover, the fact that multiple government agencies often have authority over a listed
SOE tends to further reduce the effectiveness of managerial monitoring (Qian, 1996). Since the extent to which the top management
is scrutinized is less than optimal in Chinese state-controlled listed firms, those executives may find it relatively easy to pursue their
own interests. Not surprisingly, Qian and Stiglitz (1996) argue that the top managers in Chinese (listed) SOEs benefit greatly from
perks, including the assignment of better and larger apartments, the private use of company cars, the availability of corporate
accounts for business lunches and dinners, entertainment, domestic touring, traveling abroad, etc. Such excessive perk consumption
is to the detriment of all shareholders in the listed SOEs, including the state.
As regards the PP conflict of interests, the large stake typically held by the state in Chinese listed SOEs enables the government to
expropriate minority investors in many different ways, for example by engaging in the sale (purchase) of goods and services with
related enterprises at below (above) market prices (e.g., Cheung et al., 2009), possibly to realize social or political goals. Prior
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literature has verified that related-party transactions (RPT) are frequently used to extract wealth from a firm's minority investors,
even when the government is the controlling shareholder (see also Cheung et al., 2010; Dahya et al., 2008; Huyghebaert and Wang,
2012). For example, the government could use RPT to cross-subsidize other SOEs in financial distress by buying at too high prices or
selling at too low prices. Empirical evidence shows that Chinese listed SOEs also provide excess jobs to relieve unemployment in their
region and engage in overinvestment to boost (local) GDP growth (see Dong and Putterman, 2003; Wang, 2015; Wu et al., 2012).
Compared to privately controlled listed firms, the PP problem in listed SOEs may thus take a specific form. Non-market-conforming
government intervention tends to entail this cost of political control (Bai et al., 2000; Qian, 1996). While minority investors in the
stock market could resort to public and private enforcement, the protection of investor rights is only weak in China. First, public
enforcement, including fines and prison terms for tunneling by the firm's dominant shareholder, has been hampered by the limited
authority of security market regulators. Indeed, security market regulators in China have only limited jurisdiction over the listed
firm's controlling entities, as the latter are not publicly listed. What is more, market regulators are more inclined to enforce rules
when a private block holder engages in tunneling than when a state-controlled entity expropriates minority investors. In line with this
idea, Berkman et al. (2010) find that the announcement of new rules to better protect the rights of minority investors leads to a
greater increase in firm value when the Chinese listed firm has a private rather than a state-related block holder in its ownership.
Finally, as compared with more developed countries, the legal system in China offers only few options for minority investors to
initiate private-enforcement actions against block-holder misconduct (see also Jiang et al., 2010). Here too, the courts in China have a
long tradition of protecting the best interests of the state.
Once a large non-state investor now first enters into the ownership structure of a Chinese listed SOE, the above agency problems
could be alleviated, in particular when this new block holder has both the incentives and the power to discipline the top management
as well as the controlling shareholder (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). More precisely, as the management's self-serving behavior
reduces the total wealth that can be distributed to the firm's various shareholders by means of dividends, a new non-state block holder
could henceforth effectively supervise the top management, thereby reducing its pursuit of executive goals and thus the PA conflict of
interests. MLS entry could then curb the negative effects of the management on a firm's value creation. In addition, as the value
expropriation by the firm's controlling shareholder biases the resource allocation among the firm's various shareholders, usually to
the benefit of this dominant owner, a new non-state block holder could henceforth also act as a countervailing force to the firm's
controlling shareholder, thereby alleviating the PP conflict of interests. A large non-state investor will indeed not share the gov-
ernment's enthusiasm to achieve various social or political objectives. Rather, this investor will care more about the firm's profits,
from which dividends can be paid, and thus have an interest in restricting the controlling shareholder's politically inspired activities
that harm the firm's profitability and stock market value. As a result, that new private block holder could henceforth reduce the costs
of political control by contesting the control of the listed SOE's dominant owner.
Prior research suggests that other large shareholders can influence corporate governance, either through direct intervention
(voice; see, e.g., Barroso et al., 2016; Edmans, 2014; Jiang et al., 2018) or by trading their shares (exit; see, e.g., Cheng et al., 2017;
Edmans and Manso, 2011; Hope et al., 2017). Through voice, another major shareholder could provide advice on the firm's strategic
alternatives and prevent managers from exercising their discretion and/or the dominant owner from appropriating value. Through
exit, another large shareholder could trade his shares based on his private information, which typically adversely affects the firm's
stock price. So, if the top management in a listed SOE continues harming firm value, the non-state block holder could sell his shares
and thus depress the firm's stock market valuation, which in turn is likely to provide an effective ex-ante threat to managers not to
abuse their discretion. In a similar spirit, the exit threat by a non-state block holder could also generate control contestability vis-à-vis
the government, thereby effectively deterring harmful tunneling behavior by the firm's dominant owner. Interestingly, those large
non-state shareholders are less likely to engage in rent-seeking activities by themselves (see also Lin et al., 2016). The reason is that
the support from the firm's minority investors in the stock market, for example in a proxy fight, is crucial for those non-state block
holders. Minority investors should thus be able to trust countervailing block holders to pursue the maximization of shareholder value.
In general, newly entering shareholders with a non-state nature are not interested in pursuing social or political goals, like the
government is. What's more, as shareholders with heterogeneous identities are less likely to share common interests, it could be quite
difficult for them to reach a consensus on the distribution of any side benefits that they may be able to extract from the listed SOE and
its minority investors. Arguably, in order for the above positive MLS effects to arise, it is important that the newly entering large
shareholders have a non-state nature, as only private investors have no interest in the government's various social or political
objectives and hence just aim to maximize shareholder value when advising on and evaluating the listed SOE's strategy. Only then can
they play a genuine monitoring role vis-à-vis the listed SOE's top management and dominant owner. Overall, we expect that the first
entry of a large non-state investor can strengthen the incentives and the power of shareholders to scrutinize and discipline the
management (i.e. reduce the PA conflict) and to prevent rent extraction by the firm's controlling shareholder (i.e. alleviate the PP
conflict). We therefore propose the following two hypotheses:
H1.. MLS entry mitigates the principal-agent conflict of interests in state-controlled listed firms.
H2.. MLS entry mitigates the principal-principal conflict of interests in state-controlled listed firms.
2.2. Source of MLS entry
In line with the literature, we consider the likelihood of collusion among heterogeneous large shareholders to be small (see Attig
et al., 2008; Barroso et al., 2016; Cai et al., 2016; Maury and Pajuste, 2005). This holds particularly true when the firm's controlling
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shareholder is the government, while the firm's second largest shareholder is a non-state entity (see also Lin et al., 2016). None-
theless, we claim that the governance role of a non-state block holder could still be influenced by the source of MLS entry. To that
end, we identify two different types of MLS entry, by considering also the corresponding change in government ownership. Speci-
fically, MLS entry could be combined with a significant reduction in state ownership, which might indicate that the government
deliberately decided to divest a major part of its shares to facilitate the formation of an MLS ownership structure. The entry of a non-
state block holder could then even arise from the government selling part of its own shares in a private placement (e.g., Chen and C,
2017). In contrast, the entry of a non-state block holder might not be combined with such a substantial reduction in government
ownership, which likely indicates that MLS ownership just arose from a private investor sourcing shares in the secondary market.
Under the first scenario, in which the Chinese government actually gives up a major part of its ownership and control over the listed
SOE, we presume that the government signals its proactive mindset of being open to the formation of an MLS ownership structure, to
improve corporate governance. Not surprisingly, this willingness of the government to relinquish part of its control over the listed SOE
could help the newly entered non-state investor to effectively play a disciplining role not only vis-à-vis the top management but also vis-
à-vis the largest shareholder. Indeed, this combination of MLS entry and government divestment seems like a highly effective tool to
contest the control of the firm's dominant owner (Attig et al., 2013). So, we argue that the control contestability entailed by the
reorganization of the listed SOE's ownership structure could be quite strong, with the government's partial withdrawal making it easier
for a large private investor to curtail the self-serving behavior of the firm's top management as well as largest shareholder.
Conversely, under the second scenario, in which the formation of an MLS ownership structure just arises from a non-state investor
buying a block of shares in the secondary market, we presume that the government is keeping a tight grip on the listed SOE. The
reason is exactly the unwillingness of the Chinese state to reduce its stake in that listed firm. Nonetheless, the firm's ownership
concentration will be increased as a result of MLS entry, which, in a weak institutional environment, could still be an effective tool to
curb managerial opportunistic behavior (see Ang et al., 2000; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The impact on any self-serving behavior by
the firm's dominant owner could be weaker though, given the government's decision to hold on to its ownership stake and, hence, is
an empirical question. Indeed, it remains to be seen to what extent a newly entered non-state block holder can discourage the
government from pursuing non-value-maximizing objectives, through either voice or the threat of exit. As an example, the controlling
shareholder may still consider the adverse effects from a subsequent exit by the recently entered block holder when not moderating
his own self-serving behavior, given that such a withdrawal is likely to have a severe negative impact on the firm's stock price
(Edmans, 2014; Edmans and Manso, 2011). The potential exit threat by a non-state block holder could then still produce an upfront
disciplinary effect and could therefore prevent the listed SOE's dominant owner from engaging in tunneling practices.
Considering the two above scenarios, both of which are associated with a reduction in agency problems, we propose the following
two – non-mutually exclusive – hypotheses:
H3a. MLS entry can mitigate the conflicts of interests in state-controlled listed firms when the government is willing to reduce its
control (by actually divesting a part of its ownership stake).
H3b. MLS entry can mitigate the conflicts of interests in state-controlled listed firms when the government retains its control by the
extra disciplining provided by the newly entered block holder.
2.3. Value effects of multiple large shareholders
It has been documented that MLS influence the broad dimensions of corporate strategy, including a firm's investment, financing
and dividend decisions (see Attig et al., 2013; Boateng and Huang, 2017; Jiang et al., 2018; Lin et al., 2016; Mishra, 2011). Spe-
cifically, because of their non-trivial voting rights in the Annual Meeting, other large shareholders have not only the incentives but
also the power to influence corporate strategy. The latter outcome may also show up when those countervailing shareholders can
influence the nomination and selection of the directors in the Board. Besides, MLS impact the quality of a company's accounting
disclosures (Boubaker and Sami, 2011). Not surprisingly, prior research has found a positive relation between the presence of MLS
and a firm's stock market valuation for firms with a dominant owner (see, e.g., Attig et al., 2009; Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000;
Laeven and Levine, 2008; Maury and Pajuste, 2005). In Chinese state-controlled listed firms, other large shareholders, especially
when having another (non-state) nature than that of the firm's controlling shareholder, could thus also play a value-enhancement
role, in line with what prior research has found. For that reason, we expect that Chinese listed SOEs may trade at a higher market-to-
book ratio after MLS entry.
Nonetheless, as we argue in our article, we also expect that the entry of a large non-state investor helps alleviate the coexistence of
PA and PP conflicts of interests in Chinese listed SOEs. So, other large shareholders can impose discipline and curtail the extraction of
private benefits by either the firm's top management or controlling shareholder. Correspondingly, we expect that the mitigation of
those agency problems after MLS entry should be associated with a corresponding increase in the firm's stock market value. By
relating our various proxies for PA and PP conflicts of interests to the firm's market-to-book ratio, we should be able to offer empirical
support for the idea that MLS help curbing agency problems in Chinese listed SOEs.
The above arguments therefore result in the following conjectures:
H4a. MLS entry has a positive effect on the market-to-book ratio of state-controlled listed firms.
H4b. The positive effect of MLS entry on the market-to-book ratio of state-controlled listed firms arises at least in part from its
curbing effect on PA and PP conflicts of interests.
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3. Data and variable measurements
3.1. Sample selection and data sources
First, we collected the data on all Chinese non-financial firms with A-shares listed on the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchange
between 2006 and 2017. We used 2006 as a starting year, given that approximately two thirds of the outstanding A-shares of Chinese
listed firms were non-tradable before the 2005 split-share reform, making it difficult for another investor to accumulate a sufficiently
large stake to exert influence. Our starting data set includes information on 3526 Chinese listed firms during the period 2006–2017.
We manually gathered the data on each listed firm's ultimate ownership structure from its annual reports, while the other ownership
and firm-level accounting data were retrieved from the China Securities Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database and the
Wind database.
Next, we identified a subsample of 1102 listed firms in which the largest ultimate shareholder is either the central or local gov-
ernment, the Ministry of Finance, the State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, or a state-controlled legal person. To
accurately capture the power of each firm's dominant owner, we view shareholders related to the state as one group and add up their
shareholdings (see also Jiang et al., 2018). For those 1102 listed firms, the average stake held by the Chinese government is 39.53%
(median of 38.92%), thereby supporting the idea that those listed firms are state-controlled. Among them, 392 firms maintain an
ownership structure with a single large shareholder over the entire sample period, while 146 firms experience a change in their
ownership structure to henceforth include a non-state investor with an equity stake of at least 5%. Later, we identified a subsample of
106 ‘treated’ firms, in which this newly entered non-state investor held his stake during at least three years. It turned out that for 8 out of
the 146 sample firms, the newly entered block holder had sold his stake over this three-year window. Moreover, when identifying this
subsample of 106 treated firms, we also excluded the 32 firms with state ownership still exceeding 50% after MLS entry, since it likely is
impossible for a non-state block holder to act as a countervailing force in firms that remain majority-controlled by the government.
To examine the effects of MLS entry in more detail, we next divide the subsample of 106 treated firms into two groups, according
to the source of MLS entry. Specifically, if MLS entry is combined with a significant (> 5%) reduction in state ownership, we classify
the entry of a large non-state investor as being facilitated by the government's divestment decision, denoted as R_Top1. Conversely, if
MLS entry is not combined with such a substantial reduction in state ownership, we classify the entry of a non-state block holder as
arising from this private investor sourcing shares in the secondary market, denoted as NR_Top1. The number of listed SOEs in the
R_Top1 subsample is 42, while the number of listed SOEs in the NR_Top1 subsample equals 64.
3.2. Variable measurements
3.2.1. The principal-agent conflict of interests
Although many prior studies have used the SG&A expense ratio to capture the agency problem between managers and share-
holders (see, e.g., Henry, 2010; Singh and Davidson, 2003), we believe that this variable could also be affected by the principal-
principal conflict of interests in listed SOEs. For example, if the government induces a state-controlled listed firm to engage in excess
production, that firm may have to spend more on sales promotions in order to get rid of its surplus goods, which will inflate its SG&A
expenses. Hence, we have to pay careful attention to developing measures that can uniquely capture the PA conflict. In our study, we
focus on the sample firms' excess perk consumption by managers as well as the pay-for-performance sensitivity of managerial
compensation. Specifically, a larger managerial excess perk consumption likely reflects more extensive self-serving behavior by
managers. In contrast, a higher pay-for-performance sensitivity of executive remuneration likely indicates a better alignment of
interests between managers and shareholders (see also Chen et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2015; Gao and Li, 2015).
The footnotes to the cash flow statements of Chinese listed firms contain a section that presents managerial perk-related in-
formation. Like Gul et al. (2011), we can identify eight managerial perk-related items, i.e. work-related expenses, communication
expenses, traveling expenses, business entertainment expenses, overseas training expenses, board meeting expenses, company car
expenses, and meeting expenses. Treating all those perk-related items as managerial rent extraction is inaccurate for sure, since at
least part of those outlays are to be considered as normal business expenses. We therefore rely on the following regression model to
identify the abnormal amount of managerial perk consumption (see also Gul et al., 2011; Xu et al., 2014):
= + + + + + +Perk Sales Comp Firm Size IncCap Industry Year/ it it it it it1 2 3 4 (1)
where Perk/Salesit is the sum of each firm's managerial perk-related items divided by operating revenues in year t, Compit is the
natural log of the total compensation amount (base salary and bonus)1 of the firm's three highest-paid executives in year t (see also
Chen et al., 2015), Firm Sizeit is the natural log of the book value of total assets of firm i in year t, and IncCapit is the natural log of the
year-t disposable income per capita in the region in which firm i is located. Overall, the above model has an adjusted R-square of
27.17%. Next, we use the residual of Eq. (1) as our variable of interest, i.e. Excess perkit.
To identify the sensitivity of managerial compensation with respect to firm performance, we assess how a one percentage change
1We only consider cash compensation to compute our measure, given that equity incentive plans were implemented only late in China. It is
therefore not common for the senior management of a Chinese listed firm to hold stock or stock options. Moreover, this approach is in line with
previous research using data on Chinese listed firms (e.g., Cao et al., 2011; Firth et al., 2007). Nonetheless, we will control for the management's
ownership stake, if any, in our multivariate regression analyses.
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in firm profitability affects the firm's executive remuneration. To that end, we again rely on the natural log of the total compensation
amount disbursed to the firm's three highest-paid executives as a proxy for managerial pay. To proxy for firm performance, we use the
ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization to total assets. Hence, the variable PPS is computed as follows
for each firm i in each year t:
( )
Comp Comp
/
it it
EBITDA
Assets
EBITDA
Assets
EBITDA
Assets
1
it
it
it
it
it
it
1
1
1
1 (2)
3.2.2. The principal-principal conflict of interests
To empirically capture the conflict of interests between large and minority shareholders, we first make use of RPT, which is
computed as the sum of related sales divided by operating revenues and related purchases divided by operating expenses. This
variable has been extensively used to (exclusively) capture the potential tunneling behavior by a firm's controlling shareholder (see
also Cheung et al., 2010; Dahya et al., 2008; Huyghebaert and Wang, 2012). Nonetheless, we do have to consider that in the case of
listed SOEs, RPT can also be used to redistribute wealth among SOEs to realize some social or political goals. Moreover, considering
that not all related-party transactions are utilized by the dominant owner to tunnel value away from the listed firm and its minority
investors, we only focus on the transactions that occur between this listed SOE and its parent company, other firms controlled by that
same parent company, and other firms controlled by members who have a substantial influence on the listed SOE. Hence, our
measure of related-party transactions cannot be influenced by the PA conflict of interests.
In addition, to uniquely capture the PP conflict arising from the government's social or political objectives, we compute a measure
of labor redundancy. To that end, we rely on the following Cobb-Douglas production function (see also Dong and Putterman, 2003):
=Y e K L e eit it it it Zit it0 1 2 (3)
where Yit is the value added by firm i in year t, defined as the sum of EBITDA and total wages paid to the firm's employees; Kit is
capital investment by firm i in year t, which is measured by net fixed assets; is the number of people employed by firm i in year t; Zit is
a vector of control variables, including firm characteristics and year dummy variables; εit is a random shock to the value added of firm
i in year t. To account for industry-specific effects, we estimate this Cobb-Douglas production function per industry, identified by two-
digit CSRC industry codes. Those regression models are run using the full sample of 3526 listed firms, including both state-controlled
and privately controlled firms. Next, we set the marginal product of labor of firm i in year t (MPLit) equal to the firm's average wage in
that year (Wit) in order to obtain its expected number of workers (Lit⁎). Finally, the labor redundancy of firm i in year t, is computed as
the difference between the actual number of employees (Lit) and the estimated number (Lit⁎):
= = =w MPL Y
L
e K e e L/it it it
it
it it
Z
it2
1it it0 1 2
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1
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=LR Ln L Ln L( ) ( )it it it (4)
3.3. Firm value and firm-level control variables
To gauge the stock market value effects of MLS entry, we rely on the listed SOEs' market-to-book ratio. Tobin's Q is calculated as
the market value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity, scaled by the book value of total assets.
To compute the market value of equity, we calculate the market value of all the outstanding shares by using the stock market price for
the tradable and non-tradable shares. This approach is in line with at least a number of previous studies on Chinese listed firms (e.g.,
He and Luo, 2018; Wei et al., 2005; Zhu et al., 2016). Its presumption is (implicitly) based on the idea that those two categories of
shares have the same dividend rights and voting rights.
As a first control variable, we add Top1, i.e. the fraction of outstanding shares controlled by the firm's largest ultimate share-
holder, either directly or indirectly. The other CG control variables include Mngshr (= the fraction of outstanding shares held by the
management), Board size (= the natural log of the number of directors on the Board), and Indep Dir (= the fraction of Board members
who are classified as independent).2 Finally, we expect that some other firm characteristics might impact the CG effects of MLS entry.
Hence, we further control for the following firm characteristics: Firm size (= the natural log of the book value of total assets),
Tangibles (= the ratio of net fixed assets to total assets), Leverage (= the ratio of total liabilities to total assets), and Sales growth (=
the growth rate in operating revenues from the beginning to the end of the accounting year). In the model for Tobin's Q, we also
control for the fraction of non-tradable shares (Nontradable). Table 1 summarizes the definitions of the above variables. To reduce the
influence of outliers, all variables – except for the dummy variables – are winsorized at 1–99%.
2 The official definition of an independent director is a director who holds no position in the listed company other than the post of director and
who maintains no relation with the firm or its controlling shareholder that might prevent him or her from making an independent judgment (Code of
Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China, articles 49 and 50).
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4. Methodology and descriptive analysis
4.1. Research methodology
We examine the corporate governance effects of MLS entry by means of a panel data model as well as a DID model. A major
concern in a study like ours is self-selection bias, although its impact on the parameter estimates is not a priori clear. On the one hand,
firms experiencing an MLS entry could have a smaller magnitude of agency problems, in particular when the newly entering non-state
investors carefully evaluate their investments and eliminate those listed SOEs with the largest agency problems. If that is the case, our
parameter estimates may suffer from a downward bias, which means that the observed reduction in agency costs after MLS entry in
our sample would be smaller than the average expected effect in reality. Conversely, if those newly entering non-state investors are
more willing to buy shares in firms with the largest agency problems, for example when they are convinced that their active in-
vestment approach can create the greatest shareholder value, then the positive effects of MLS entry that we observe in our sample
may be upward biased. From a theoretical point of view, it is not a priori clear though whether non-state investors would (always)
prefer to invest in listed SOEs with small vs. large agency problems.
To address the concern of a potential self-selection bias, we apply the Heckman two-stage correction method to our panel data
models. In the first-stage selection equation, we add the one-year lagged industry-specific fraction of Chinese listed SOEs with MLS
ownership (MLS_Peers). We consider this variable as an appropriate instrument, as the odds that a non-state investor buys a block of
shares in a listed SOE without MLS likely are higher if MLS ownership is frequently observed among that firm's peers in the same
industry (see also Jiang et al., 2018). In the second stage, we then add the inverse Mills ratio to the panel data models. Next, we use
the propensity-score-matching (PSM) technique to select a set of comparable non-treated firms for our sample of treated firms when
running the DID model (see also Chen et al., 2018; Defond et al., 2015; Fauver et al., 2017; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1984). In addition
to alleviating any concerns about reverse causality, this PSM-DID model also helps addressing the potential endogeneity problem
arising from self-selection. The procedure is implemented by first running a probit model to estimate the odds of treatment, using the
firm-level data in year t-1, i.e. the year before MLS entry. We require potential benchmark firms to have a single large shareholder in
the three years before and the three years after the treated firm exhibits an MLS entry.3 The explanatory variables in this probit model
include Top1, Prof, Firm size, Tangibles, Leverage, and Sales growth, as well as industry and year dummies. The PSM procedure reveals
that, except for one treated firm, all the others could be matched with a corresponding non-treated firm; we thus lose only one treated
Table 1
Definition of variables.
Variables Definition
The entry of MLS
Change Dummy variable that equals one for the treated firms as of MLS entry, and zero otherwise
Treat Dummy variable that equals one for firms that ever experience a change from an ownership structure with a single large shareholder to an MLS
ownership structure, and zero otherwise
Post Dummy variable that equals one after MLS entry, and zero otherwise
Economic consequences of MLS entry
Excess perk Difference between actual managerial perk-related expenses and normal perk consumption, computed like Gul et al. (2011) and Xu et al.
(2014)
PPS Change in managerial compensation associated with a one percentage change in firm performance, measured by the ratio of EBITDA to total
assets
RPT Sum of related sales divided by operating revenues and related purchases divided by operating expenses
LR Difference between the actual number of employees and the optimal number of employees, computed like Dong and Putterman (2003)
Tobin's Q Market value of equity plus book value of total assets minus book value of equity, divided by book value of total assets
Control variables
Top1 Fraction of outstanding shares held by the largest ultimate shareholder
Mngshr Fraction of outstanding shares held by the management
Board size Natural log of the total number of directors on the Board
IndDep Dir Fraction of independent directors on the Board
Firm size Natural log of the book value of total assets
Tangibles Ratio of net fixed assets to total assets
Leverage Ratio of total liabilities to total assets
Sales growth Growth rate in operating revenues from the beginning to the end of the accounting year
Nontradable Fraction of outstanding shares that are non-tradable
This table presents the definitions of all the variables used in this study.
3 In the PSM-DID model, the period of analysis is limited to the three years before and the three years after the first entry of a large non-state
investor in the treated firm's ownership, which also helps mitigating any concerns about confounding events. The MLS entry year is always included
in the post-period because any MLS effects may already show up by the end of the entry year (see also Defond et al., 2015). As an example, if a
private investor buys a block of shares in a Chinese listed SOE without MLS in 2010, the pre-period is from 2007 to 2009, while the post-period
ranges from 2010 to 2012 in the PSM-DID model. In the panel data model, the pre-period is from 2006 to 2009, while the post-period ranges from
2010 to 2017.
F. Chen, et al. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 57 (2019) 101203
8
firm in the PSM-DID analysis.4 Our panel data and PSM-DID regression models are represented by Eqs. (5) and (6), respectively:
= + + + + + + +
+ + + + + +
Agency proxy Change Top Mngshr Board size Indep Dir Firm size Tangibles
Leverage Sales growth Inverse Mills ratio Industry Year
1it it it it it it it it
it it it it
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9 10 (5)
= + + + + + + + +
+ + + + + +
Agency proxy Treat Post Treat Post Top Mngshr Board size Indep Dir
Firm size Tangibles Leverage Sales growth Industry Year
1it i it i it it it it it
it it it it it
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 10 11 (6)
In the panel data regression model, we use the variable Change to capture the effects of MLS entry. Specifically, Changeit is set
equal to one for the treated firms after the first entry of a large non-state investor, and equal to zero in the years before. The
(unbalanced) sample that is used in the panel data model thus includes all firm-year observations for the 106 treated firms, i.e. 970
firm-year observations. The number of observations in the R_Top1 subsample is 394, while it is 576 in the NR_Top1 subsample.
In the DID regression model using the PSM sample, we compute an indicator variable for the treated firms (Treat) along with its
interaction with an indicator variable for MLS entry (Post). More precisely, Treati is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm
experiences a change in its ownership structure from a single to multiple large shareholders, and zero otherwise. In addition, Postit
equals one as of MLS entry and zero in the years before. So, while the coefficient of interest is that on the variable Change in the panel
data regression model, it is that on the interaction term Treat*Post in the PSM-DID regression model; it captures the change in an
economic output variable for the treated firms relative to the change in this same variable for the non-treated benchmark firms. The
final (unbalanced) sample that is used in the PSM-DID model includes 1025 firm-year observations, of which 526 correspond with the
treated firms and 499 with the non-treated benchmark firms. When taking into account the source of MLS entry, the number of
observations in the R_Top1 subsample now is 383, while it is 642 in the NR_Top1 subsample.
4.2. Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis
Table 2, Panels A and B display the sample distribution by year and by industry, respectively for the 106 treated firms and the 392
non-treated firms. The number of state-controlled listed firms experiencing a change in their ownership structure from a single to
multiple large shareholders reaches its peak in 2015, which can be related to the 2015 mixed ownership reform5; before 2012, this
phenomenon occurs less frequently. In addition, and as shown in Panel B, most sample firms are active in the manufacturing industry,
making up approximately 50% of the sample. Yet, we do not find that the treated firms are represented more in particular industries.
Table 3, Panel A reports summary statistics (average and median) for the various test and control variables for the 106 treated
firms before vs. after a non-state investor buys a substantial block of shares. We also investigate the significance of the changes in
those variables using a parametric t-test as well as a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test. As shown in Panel A, the firms'
discretionary perk consumption by managers diminishes significantly after MLS entry. As for the pay-for-performance sensitivity of
managerial compensation, its value after MLS ownership emerges is significantly larger, yet only based upon the non-parametric test.
While the magnitude of related-party transactions and labor redundancy are reduced after MLS entry, those effects are in general not
statistically significant. The average value of LR before MLS entry (0.502) indicates that the actual number of employees in Chinese
state-controlled listed firms is approximately 1.7 times its expected number before a large non-state investor first enters into these
firms' ownership. Next, the treated firms experience a significant increase in their stock market valuation after MLS ownership
emerges, as reflected by their higher Tobin's Q. The market-to-book ratio indeed increases from 2.156 before to 2.430 after MLS entry.
As to the CG variables, ownership is concentrated among Chinese listed SOEs, as the largest shareholder (the Chinese state) controls
approximately 33.8% of outstanding shares before MLS entry. This fraction is reduced to an average 28.7% afterwards. Moreover,
managerial shareholdings increase significantly in the years after MLS entry, yet remain only at 0.8% on average in the post-entry
period. In contrast, the size of the Board and the fraction of independent directors are not significantly impacted by MLS entry.
Finally, firm size increases significantly, while the fraction of tangible assets and the debt ratio are significantly reduced after MLS
entry. The other control variables are not influenced by the first entry of a large non-state investor.
Next, to better understand the similarities and the disparities between the treated and non-treated firms, Panel B of Table 3 shows
the results from a descriptive analysis that compares the 106 treated firms before their treatment with the 392 non-treated firms.
Except for Excess perk, which has a lower average and median value for the non-treated firms, and RPT, which has a larger median
value for the non-treated firms, we find no significant differences in our PA or PP proxies across these two groups. However, most of
the control variables are distributed significantly differently across these two groups. For example, non-treated firms have a sig-
nificantly larger state ownership (Top1) and a significantly larger number of directors (Board size). Non-treated firms also have a
4 Appendix A provides more details on the construction of the PSM sample. Panel A reports the results from the probit regression model that is
used to compute the propensity scores, using the nearest neighbor matching technique without replacement. Learning from Chen et al. (2018) and
Fauver et al. (2017), we also find that the explanatory power of the probit model to identify the treated firms decreases over time, thereby indicating
a successful PSM. Furthermore, in Panel B, we compare the differences between the treated firms and the non-treated benchmark firms before and
after PSM. The results again indicate that the PSM technique was effective, given that the significant differences between the treated firms and the
non-treated benchmark firms are all mitigated after PSM.
5 In September 2015, the CPC Central Committee and the State Council issued the Opinion on Deepening the Reforms of State-Owned Enterprises,
which proposed to “promote the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises to amplify the function of state-owned capital and to
improve the efficiency of state-owned assets”.
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significantly larger size (Firm size), a significantly lower fraction of tangible assets (Tangibles), and a significantly lower debt ratio
(Leverage). Those differences in control variables therefore indirectly demonstrate the need for propensity-score matching to enhance
the comparability of the treated and non-treated firms in the multivariate regression analyses.
Finally, Panel C of Table 3 compares the treated firms in the R_Top1 and NR_Top1 subsamples, which again indicates the need for
propensity-score matching. Indeed, the firms in which the government is willing to reduce its ownership seem not chosen randomly,
as they have a lower excess managerial perk consumption (Excess perk), a higher magnitude of related-party transactions (RPT), and
less excess personnel (LR). In addition, they have a significantly larger state ownership (Top1), a significantly lower fraction of shares
held by managers (Mngshr), and a significantly larger fraction of independent directors (Indep Dir). Finally, those firms have a
significantly larger size (Firm size), a significantly larger fraction of tangible assets (Tangibles), and a significantly larger fraction of
non-tradable shares (Nontradable).
5. Empirical results
In this section, we empirically analyze the effects of MLS entry on the various agency problems of Chinese listed SOEs as well as
their stock market valuation. Before estimating the multivariate models, we examine the correlation matrix for the explanatory
variables (not tabulated).6 It shows that the correlation coefficients between the various test and control variables never exceed 0.7.
So, the current test and control variables can be included at the same time in the various regression models. Moreover, as the VIF
Table 2
Distribution of the sample by year and industry.
Panel A: Distribution by year
No. of treated firms Total observations Treated-firm observations Non-treated-firm observations
Year N % N % N % N %
2006 0 0.00 380 7.90 75 7.73 305 7.95
2007 5 4.72 366 7.61 76 7.84 290 7.56
2008 6 5.66 371 7.72 80 8.25 291 7.58
2009 5 4.72 406 8.44 89 9.18 317 8.26
2010 5 4.72 400 8.32 85 8.76 315 8.21
2011 5 4.72 422 8.78 88 9.07 334 8.70
2012 10 9.43 447 9.30 91 9.38 356 9.28
2013 7 6.60 427 8.88 89 9.18 338 8.81
2014 16 15.09 409 8.51 82 8.45 327 8.52
2015 22 20.75 404 8.40 74 7.63 330 8.60
2016 18 16.98 407 8.47 72 7.42 335 8.73
2017 7 6.60 369 7.67 69 7.11 300 7.82
Total 106 100 4808 100 970 100 3838 100.00
Panel B: Distribution by industry
Total observations Treated-firm observations Non-treated-firm observations
Industry N % N % N %
Agriculture 83 1.73 20 2.06 63 1.64
Mining 183 3.81 25 2.58 158 4.12
Manufacturing 2677 55.68 510 52.58 2167 56.46
Utilities 239 4.97 48 4.95 191 4.98
Construction 111 2.31 6 0.62 105 2.74
Wholesale and retail 536 11.15 123 12.68 413 10.76
Transportation 239 4.97 47 4.85 192 5.00
Accommodation & catering 13 0.27 12 1.24 1 0.03
Information tech. 125 2.60 30 3.09 95 2.48
Real estate 347 7.22 91 9.38 256 6.67
Leasing 55 1.14 16 1.65 39 1.02
Scientific research 9 0.19 1 0.10 8 0.21
Public facility management 28 0.58 4 0.41 24 0.63
Resident service 8 0.17 0 0.00 8 0.21
Education 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
Culture and sports 33 0.69 0 0.00 33 0.86
Diversified 122 2.54 37 3.81 85 2.21
Total 4808 100 970 100 3838 100
This table presents the distribution of the sample firms and the sample observations by year (Panel A) and by industry (Panel B). The panel data
sample includes all the firm-years observations for the 106 treated firms and the 392 non-treated firms during the period 2006–2017.
6 The outcomes of all additional tests that are discussed but not shown in the paper can be obtained from authors upon request.
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statistics never exceed five in any regression model, multicollinearity did not pose a problem in our study. In the following sections,
we explore the effects of MLS entry on our PA and PP proxies and also verify its role for the firms' market-to-book ratio.
5.1. The effects of MLS entry on the principal-agent conflict of interests in listed SOEs
We first examine the role of MLS in mitigating the PA conflict of interests. Table 4 reports the results from the panel data model,
while Table 5 displays the results from the PSM-DID model. To capture this PA problem, we make use of the listed SOEs' excess
managerial perk consumption (Excess perk) and pay-for-performance sensitivity of managerial compensation (PPS) in Panels A and B,
respectively. Moreover, to account for a potentially different effect of MLS entry depending upon its source, we show the regression
output for the total sample (columns 1 and 4), for the R_Top1 subsample (columns 2 and 5), and for the NR_Top1 subsample (columns
3 and 6). In all models, we always control for industry and year fixed effects, while we also cluster the standard errors at the firm level
Table 3
Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis.
Panel A: Treated firms before vs. after MLS entry Panel B: Non-treated vs. treated firms before MLS entry
Before MLS entry After MLS entry t-test Wilcoxon test Non-treated firms t-test Wilcoxon test
Mean Median Mean Median Mean_diff Median_diff Mean Median Mean_diff Median_diff
Economic output variables
Excess perk 0.001 −0.000 −0.000 −0.001 −0.001⁎⁎ −0.001⁎⁎⁎ −0.001 −0.001 −0.001⁎⁎⁎ −0.001⁎⁎⁎
PPS −0.032 0.000 0.221 0.001 0.252 0.001⁎ −0.049 0.000 −0.018 0.000
RPT 0.413 0.152 0.377 0.125 −0.036 −0.027 0.453 0.216 0.040 0.064⁎⁎⁎
LR 0.502 0.584 0.466 0.574 −0.036 −0.010 0.518 0.609 0.016 0.025
Tobin's Q 2.156 1.696 2.430 1.808 0.273⁎⁎ 0.112⁎ 2.123 1.652 −0.033 −0.044
Control variables
Top1 0.338 0.325 0.287 0.290 −0.051⁎⁎⁎ −0.035⁎⁎⁎ 0.441 0.444 0.103⁎⁎⁎ 0.119⁎⁎⁎
Mngshr 0.002 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.006⁎⁎⁎ 0.000⁎⁎⁎ 0.002 0.000 −0.001 0.000⁎⁎⁎
Board Size 2.192 2.197 2.194 2.197 0.002 0.000 2.209 2.197 0.017⁎ 0.000⁎⁎
Indep Dir 0.364 0.333 0.370 0.333 0.006 0.000 0.366 0.333 0.003 0.000
Firm size 21.993 21.818 22.561 22.421 0.568⁎⁎⁎ 0.603⁎⁎⁎ 22.379 22.281 0.386⁎⁎⁎ 0.463⁎⁎⁎
Tangibles 0.285 0.259 0.237 0.203 −0.048⁎⁎⁎ −0.056⁎⁎⁎ 0.522 0.536 −0.021⁎⁎ −0.026⁎⁎⁎
Leverage 0.549 0.573 0.526 0.544 −0.023⁎ −0.029 0.265 0.233 −0.027⁎⁎⁎ −0.037⁎⁎⁎
Sales growth 0.173 0.120 0.204 0.093 0.031 −0.027 0.170 0.099 −0.003 −0.021
Nontradable 0.177 0.122 0.168 0.097 −0.009 −0.025 0.185 0.030 0.008 −0.092
No. of obs. 609 609 361 361 970 970 3838 3838 4447 4447
Panel C: Treated firms in the R_Top1 vs. NR_Top1 subsamples before MLS entry
R_Top1 NR_Top1 t-test Wilcoxon test
Mean Median Mean Median Mean_diff Median_diff
Economic output variables
Excess perk −0.000 −0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002⁎⁎⁎ 0.001⁎⁎⁎
PPS 0.172 0.006 −0.175 0.000 −0.347 −0.006
RPT 0.549 0.351 0.318 0.064 −0.231⁎⁎⁎ −0.287⁎⁎⁎
LR 0.435 0.498 0.549 0.647 0.114⁎ 0.149
Tobin's Q 2.194 1.699 2.130 1.696 −0.064 −0.003
Control variables
Top1 0.442 0.466 0.265 0.252 −0.177⁎⁎⁎ −0.214⁎⁎⁎
Mngshr 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.002⁎⁎ 0.000⁎⁎⁎
Board Size 2.197 2.197 2.189 2.197 −0.008 −0.000
Indep Dir 0.368 0.333 0.361 0.333 −0.007⁎ −0.000
Firm size 22.058 22.223 21.947 21.714 −0.112 −0.509⁎⁎
Tangibles 0.304 0.305 0.272 0.245 −0.031⁎⁎ −0.060⁎
Leverage 0.554 0.571 0.545 0.574 −0.008 0.003
Sales growth 0.199 0.130 0.155 0.115 −0.044 −0.015
Nontradable 0.221 0.144 0.146 0.094 −0.075⁎⁎⁎ −0.050⁎⁎
No. of obs. 251 251 358 358 609 609
This table shows descriptive statistics and the results from univariate tests for the 106 treated firms and the 392 non-treated firms. Panel A reports
the descriptive statistics for the treated firms only and compares those statistics before vs. after MLS entry. Panel B presents the descriptive statistics
for the non-treated firms and compares them with the treated firms before MLS entry (as reported in Panel A). Panel C shows the descriptive
statistics for the treated firms before MLS entry, depending upon whether the government divests (R_Top1) versus does not divest (NR_Top1) a
substantial part of its ownership stake. In each Panel, we use a parametric t-test as well as a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test to investigate
the significance of differences across the two groups. The variables examined in this table are defined in Table 1.
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to avoid correlations in the error term due to firm-level unobserved heterogeneity (Petersen, 2009).7
As shown in Panel A of Tables 4 and 5, the relation between MLS entry and Excess perk is highly significant and negative in the
NR_Top1 subsample, in the panel data as well as PSM-DID regression model. Those findings therefore provide strong empirical
support for Hypothesis 1, positing that the PA conflict of interests is reduced after MLS entry. Considering the source of MLS entry, as
the above relation only arises when the government retains its ownership stake, we also find empirical confirmation for Hypothesis 3b.
Overall, the identified relation is economically significant as well, as an increase in Change from zero to one is associated with a 0.609
standard deviation reduction in Excess perk in the panel data model (column 3 of Table 4), while an increase in Treat*Post from zero to
one is associated with a 0.277 standard deviation decline in Excess perk in the PSM-DID model (column 3 of Table 5).
Next, Panel B of Tables 4 and 5 reveal a significant positive relation between MLS entry and PPS in the NR_Top1 subsample,
regardless of the used regression model. More precisely, we observe that the first entry of a large non-state investor in the ownership
of a listed SOE significantly enhances that firm's pay-for-performance-sensitivity of managerial compensation, in both the panel data
and PSM-DID model. These findings thus offer further support for Hypothesis 1. Nonetheless, as those relations are again only ob-
served for the NR_Top1 subsample, they uniquely substantiate Hypothesis 3b. From an economic perspective, an increase in Change
from zero to one is associated with a 0.273 standard deviation rise in PPS in the panel data model (column 6 of Table 4), while an
increase in Treat*Post from zero to one is associated with a 0.329 standard deviation rise in PPS in the PSM-DID model (column 6 of
Table 5).
Table 4
Panel data regression model: excess perk consumption & pay-for-performance sensitivity.
Panel A: Excess perk consumption Panel B: Pay-for-performance sensitivity
Treated R_Top1 NR_Top1 Treated R_Top1 NR_Top1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 0.009 0.006 0.024 −0.373 2.588 −2.255
(0.611) (0.411) (1.053) (−0.177) (0.745) (−1.000)
The entry of MLS
Change −0.002⁎ 0.002 −0.004⁎⁎⁎ 0.411 0.069 0.670⁎
(−1.942) (1.206) (−3.205) (1.631) (0.130) (1.928)
CG and firm-level controls
Top1 −0.006 0.007 −0.013⁎ 0.760 −2.416 1.591
(−1.536) (1.249) (−1.773) (0.820) (−1.123) (1.001)
Mngshr −0.019 0.126 −0.040⁎⁎ −1.087 −21.159⁎ 6.397
(−0.789) (1.469) (−2.256) (−0.161) (−1.781) (0.931)
Board size 0.001 0.005 −0.002 −0.653 −1.738 −0.302
(0.225) (1.669) (−0.321) (−1.153) (−1.530) (−0.503)
Indep Dir −0.009 −0.005 −0.014 −2.192 0.216 −2.932
(−1.200) (−0.475) (−1.113) (−1.410) (0.092) (−1.173)
Firm size −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 0.079 0.065 0.164⁎
(−0.262) (−0.404) (−0.638) (1.064) (0.686) (1.852)
Tangibles −0.006⁎⁎⁎ −0.004 −0.009⁎⁎⁎ 0.037 0.051 −0.007
(−2.724) (−1.230) (−2.902) (0.065) (0.053) (−0.009)
Leverage −0.005 −0.003 −0.003 0.126 −0.186 0.016
(−1.631) (−0.852) (−0.977) (0.281) (−0.217) (0.026)
Sales growth 0.000 −0.000 0.000 0.131 0.062 0.145
(0.233) (−0.017) (0.143) (1.082) (0.399) (0.924)
Inverse Mills ratio −0.002 −0.004 −0.000 0.124 1.003 −0.357
(−1.037) (−1.220) (−0.239) (0.263) (1.079) (−0.703)
No. of obs. 970 394 576 970 394 576
Adj. R-square 0.092 0.184 0.183 −0.014 −0.004 −0.015
This table presents the panel data regression results for the principal-agent conflict of interests, captured by Excess perk in Panel A and PPS in Panel
B. For each variable, we first report the results for the full sample of 106 treated firms in columns 1 and 4. Then, we separately report results for the
two subsamples according to the source of MLS entry. If the reduction in government ownership (Top1) is larger than 5% of outstanding shares after
the entry of a large non-state investor, we identify it as a significant reduction, namely R_Top1; otherwise, we treat it as an insignificant reduction in
Top1, namely NR_Top1. The results for the R_Top1 subsample are reported in columns 2 and 4, while the results for the NR_Top1 subsample are
reported in columns 3 and 5. Change is a dummy variable that equals one for the treated firms in all years as of MLS entry and zero in the years
before MLS entry. Regression models always include industry and year fixed effects, with standard errors clustered at the firm level. Models also
include Heckman's inverse Mills ratio to control for potential self-selection bias. All other test and control variables are defined in Table 1.
Note: Significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 level is denoted by ⁎, ⁎⁎, and ⁎⁎⁎, respectively.
7 We were not able to run the regression models using firm fixed effects, as some of our internal CG variables showed too limited variation over
time. So, we adjusted the standard errors of the parameter estimates by clustering the observations at the firm level to avoid any correlations in the
error term due to firm-level unobserved heterogeneity (and added industry and year dummies to the regression models as well). This practice indeed
produces standard errors that are robust to interdependencies among the observations that are related to the same firm.
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Arguably, the above findings point out that the restraining effects of MLS on the PA agency problem materialize only when the
new non-state block holder sources his shares in the stock market (Hypothesis 3b). We indeed find no empirical evidence whatsoever
for Hypothesis 3a, which therefore rules out that the PA conflict can be curbed by a simple reorganization of the listed SOEs' own-
ership structure. Rather, an increase in ownership concentration is needed to realize the beneficial effects of MLS entry on the PA
problem. Possibly, the newly entered block holder takes into account that the costs of political control are difficult to address in firms
in which the government keeps its control over the listed SOE. This second largest shareholder may then decide to handle the PA
problem with priority, to promptly start creating shareholder value (“harvest the low-hanging fruits”).
Not many of the firm-level control variables are statistically significant in Tables 4 and 5. If anything, we do find that the excess
perk consumption by managers is lower when the firm's largest shareholder owns a larger equity stake, as evidenced by a higher value
for Top 1. This result is consistent with prior research, arguing that a more concentrated ownership structure can relieve the PA
conflict of interests in listed firms (see, e.g., Ang et al., 2000; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Nonetheless, it is interesting to observe that
this effect also arises when the firm's largest shareholder is the state, which usually is considered as a not-too-effective monitor of top
management (e.g., Bai et al., 2000; Qian, 1996). Finally, the inverse Mills ratio is never significant in any of our second-stage
regressions. The latter outcome therefore indicates that the problem of self-selection is not severe when exploring the effects of MLS
entry on the PA problem.
5.2. The effects of MLS entry on the principal-principal conflict of interests in listed SOEs
We next analyze the role of MLS in alleviating the PP conflict of interests. Table 6 reports the results from the panel data model,
Table 5
PSM-DID regression model: excess perk consumption & pay-for-performance sensitivity.
Panel A: Excess perk consumption Panel B: Pay-for-performance sensitivity
PSM sample R_Top1 NR_Top1 PSM sample R_Top1 NR_Top1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 0.020 0.022⁎ 0.022 0.665 1.471 0.320
(1.496) (1.682) (1.101) (0.361) (0.481) (0.112)
The entry of MLS
Treat 0.001 0.002 0.001 −0.075 0.387 −0.470
(1.155) (1.355) (0.612) (−0.316) (1.036) (−1.498)
Post −0.001 0.001 −0.001 0.054 −0.033 0.009
(−0.908) (1.173) (−1.493) (0.262) (−0.099) (0.035)
Treat⁎Post −0.001 −0.001 −0.002⁎⁎ 0.299 −0.194 0.757⁎
(−1.541) (−0.541) (−2.098) (0.979) (−0.382) (1.944)
CG and firm-level controls
Top1 −0.011⁎⁎⁎ −0.013⁎⁎ −0.011⁎ 0.690 0.632 −0.264
(−2.712) (−2.175) (−1.819) (1.134) (0.632) (−0.295)
Mngshr −0.007 0.116 −0.037⁎ 1.583 −22.509⁎⁎ 6.755
(−0.352) (1.450) (−1.968) (0.355) (−2.221) (1.193)
Board size 0.003 0.002 0.004 −0.287 −0.013 −0.268
(0.884) (0.756) (0.769) (−0.784) (−0.018) (−0.589)
Indep Dir −0.005 0.006 −0.011 −0.264 4.360 −2.709
(−0.762) (0.569) (−1.092) (−0.190) (1.508) (−1.498)
Firm size −0.001 −0.000 −0.001 −0.106 −0.158 −0.059
(−1.131) (−0.631) (−1.064) (−1.583) (−1.133) (−0.749)
Tangibles −0.006⁎⁎⁎ −0.002 −0.008⁎⁎ 0.362 −0.100 −0.249
(−2.661) (−0.674) (−2.400) (0.836) (−0.117) (−0.451)
Leverage −0.003 −0.005 −0.002 0.589 −0.054 0.371
(−1.147) (−1.320) (−0.688) (1.631) (−0.070) (0.869)
Sales growth −0.001 0.000 −0.001 0.347⁎⁎ 0.334 0.240
(−1.287) (0.443) (−0.878) (2.334) (1.528) (1.189)
No. of obs. 1025 383 642 1025 383 642
Adj. R-square 0.073 0.133 0.097 0.008 0.031 0.039
This table presents the PSM-DID regression results for the principal-agent conflict of interests, captured by Excess perk in Panel A and PPS in Panel B.
For each variable, we first report the results for the full sample of 105 treated firms in columns 1 and 4. Then, we separately report results for the two
subsamples according to the source of MLS entry. If the reduction in government ownership (Top1) is larger than 5% of outstanding shares after the
entry of a large non-state investor, we identify it as a significant reduction, namely R_Top1; otherwise, we treat it as an insignificant reduction in
Top1, namely NR_Top1. The results for the R_Top1 subsample are reported in columns 2 and 5, while the results for the NR_Top1 subsample are
reported in columns 3 and 6. Treat is a dummy variable that equals one for the treated firms that experience a change in ownership structure from a
single to multiple large shareholders and equals zero for the non-treated benchmark firms. Post is a dummy variable that equals one in all years as of
MLS entry and zero in the years before. Regression models always include industry and year fixed effects, with standard errors clustered at the firm
level. All other test and control variables are defined in Table 1.
Note: Significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 level is denoted by ⁎, ⁎⁎, and ⁎⁎⁎, respectively.
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while Table 7 displays the results from the PSM-DID model. To capture this PP problem, we rely on the listed SOEs' related-party
transactions (RPT) and labor redundancy (LR) in Panels A and B, respectively. Moreover, to account for a potentially different effect
of MLS entry depending upon its source, we again show the regression output for the total sample (columns 1 and 4), for the R_Top1
subsample (columns 2 and 5), and for the NR_Top1 subsample (columns 3 and 6).
In contrast to the univariate results in Table 3, we now do find that MLS entry significantly mitigates related-party transactions
and labor redundancy in Chinese state-controlled listed firms. Specifically, Panel A of Tables 6 and 7 reveal a highly significant and
negative relation between MLS entry and RPT in the NR_Top1 subsample, in both the panel data and PSM-DID model. Those findings
therefore provide strong empirical support for Hypothesis 2, arguing that the PP problem is reduced after MLS entry. Considering the
source of MLS entry, as the above relation only arises when the government retains its ownership stake, we again find empirical
evidence for Hypothesis 3b. Arguably, this outcome indicates that the Chinese government becomes more careful in appropriating
value from non-state shareholders through related-party transactions when at least one of those other investors is holding a large-
enough stake to scrutinize the behavior of the firm's dominant owner. From an economic point of view, an increase in Change from
zero to one is associated with a 0.343 standard deviation reduction in RPT in the panel data model (column 3 of Table 6), while an
increase in Treat*Post from zero to one is associated with a 0.320 standard deviation decline in RPT in the PSM-DID model (column 3
of Table 7).
Next, we also observe a highly significant and negative relation between MLS entry and LR in the R_Top1 subsample, irrespective
of the used regression model. Those findings therefore offer further support for Hypothesis 2. However, as the curtailing effect of MLS
on labor redundancy now appears to be driven uniquely by the R_Top1 subsample, we find some empirical support for Hypothesis 3a
after all. The latter finding also indicates that the labor redundancy in Chinese listed SOEs can be moderated by MLS entry if the
Table 6
Panel data regression model: related-party transactions & labor redundancy.
Panel A: Related-party transactions Panel B: Labor redundancy
Treated R_Top1 NR_Top1 Treated R_Top1 NR_Top1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 2.029⁎⁎⁎ 1.886 2.360⁎⁎ 3.889⁎⁎⁎ 4.381⁎⁎⁎ 2.687⁎⁎
(2.767) (1.306) (2.526) (4.154) (2.818) (2.095)
The entry of MLS
Change −0.097⁎ −0.045 −0.170⁎⁎ −0.208⁎⁎ −0.452⁎⁎⁎ −0.103
(−1.819) (−0.411) (−2.289) (−2.440) (−3.203) (−1.012)
CG and firm-level controls
Top1 0.687⁎⁎ 0.448 0.682⁎⁎ −0.818⁎ −0.892 −0.238
(2.577) (0.806) (2.182) (−1.951) (−1.099) (−0.446)
Mngshr −1.358 −2.731 −0.831 −2.784⁎ −0.573 −1.747
(−0.934) (−0.871) (−0.488) (−1.796) (−0.107) (−1.005)
Board size −0.380⁎⁎ −0.592⁎ −0.203 −0.208 0.015 −0.233
(−2.383) (−1.873) (−1.085) (−0.956) (0.047) (−0.777)
Indep Dir −0.985⁎⁎ −1.729⁎ −0.252 −0.169 −1.619 0.951
(−2.052) (−1.972) (−0.455) (−0.269) (−1.647) (0.994)
Firm size −0.072⁎⁎ −0.020 −0.117⁎⁎⁎ −0.142⁎⁎⁎ −0.167⁎⁎ −0.116⁎⁎
(−2.166) (−0.338) (−2.728) (−3.120) (−2.361) (−2.146)
Tangibles 0.078 −0.126 0.185 −0.358 −0.487 −0.168
(0.436) (−0.349) (0.895) (−1.555) (−1.300) (−0.599)
Leverage 0.670⁎⁎⁎ 0.674 0.620⁎⁎⁎ 1.097⁎⁎⁎ 1.229⁎⁎⁎ 1.112⁎⁎⁎
(3.344) (1.554) (2.882) (4.950) (3.120) (4.607)
Sales growth −0.004 −0.069 0.072 −0.132 0.021 −0.358⁎⁎⁎
(−0.073) (−0.918) (0.804) (−1.337) (0.183) (−2.887)
Inverse Mills ratio −0.021 0.035 −0.036 0.181 0.032 0.211
(−0.183) (0.138) (−0.272) (1.507) (0.144) (1.614)
No. of obs. 970 394 576 970 394 576
Adj. R-square 0.251 0.250 0.231 0.393 0.452 0.397
This table presents the panel data regression results for the principal-principal conflict, as captured by Related-party transactions, i.e. the sum of
related sales divided by operating revenues and related purchases divided by operating expenses in Panel A, and Labor redundancy, i.e. the difference
between actual number of employees and the optimal number of employees in Panel B. For each variable, we first report results for the full sample of
106 treated firms in columns 1 and 4. Then, we separately report results for the two subsamples according to the source of MLS entry. If the
reduction in government ownership (Top1) is larger than 5% of outstanding shares after the entry of a large non-state investor, we identify it as a
significant reduction, namely R_Top1; otherwise, we treat it as an insignificant reduction in Top1, namely NR_Top1. The results for the R_Top1
subsample are reported in columns 2 and 5, while the results for the NR_Top1 subsample are reported in columns 3 and 6. Change is a dummy
variable that equals one for the treated firms in all years as of MLS entry and zero in the years before MLS entry. Regression models always include
industry and year fixed effects, with standard errors clustered at the firm level. Models also include Heckman's inverse Mills ratio to control for
potential self-selection bias. All other test and control variables are defined in Table 1.
Note: Significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 level is denoted by ⁎, ⁎⁎, and ⁎⁎⁎, respectively.
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government is willing to relinquish part of its ownership (control) over those listed SOEs. Probably, the contestability of the dominant
owner's power is increased under the latter scenario, making it easier for a large non-state investor to tackle these more complex types
of agency problems (costs of political control). From an economic point of view, an increase in Change from zero to one is associated
with a 0.543 standard deviation reduction in LR in the panel data model (column 5 of Table 6), while an increase in Treat*Post from
zero to one is associated with a 0.432 standard deviation decline in LR in the PSM-DID model (column 5 of Table 7).
As to the CG control variables, we find a positive coefficient on Top1 in the RPT regression models, which indicates that a larger
fraction of voting rights controlled by the firm's dominant owner aggravates tunneling practices in Chinese listed SOEs. In contrast,
the magnitude of related-party transactions is significantly reduced when those firms have a larger number of directors on their Board
and a larger fraction of independent directors (see also Cheung et al., 2009). As to LR, we find that the fraction of shares held by the
government (Top1) does not matter, while a larger managerial ownership stake can – to some extent – restrain the problem of
redundant personnel. The latter result thus indicates that managers care more about firm efficiency if their interests are better aligned
with those of (non-state) shareholders. As to the other control variables, we find that Firm size is significantly negatively, while
Leverage is significantly positively associated with RPT and LR, in line with the idea that the largest and most indebted SOEs continue
to benefit from soft budget constraints. Finally, the insignificant inverse Mills ratios again indicate that the problem of self-selection is
not severe when studying the effects of MLS entry on the PP conflict of interests.
Table 7
PSM-DID regression model: related-party transactions & labor redundancy.
Panel A: Related-party transactions Panel B: Labor redundancy
PSM sample R_Top1 NR_Top1 PSM sample R_Top1 NR_Top1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 0.959 −0.134 1.725⁎⁎ 4.303⁎⁎⁎ 5.036⁎⁎⁎ 3.059⁎⁎
(1.211) (−0.105) (2.406) (4.521) (3.612) (2.511)
The entry of MLS
Treat 0.109⁎ 0.076 0.107 0.031 0.008 0.054
(1.845) (0.648) (1.600) (0.386) (0.065) (0.484)
Post 0.001 −0.014 0.044 0.004 0.013 −0.051
(0.013) (−0.188) (0.712) (0.054) (0.119) (−0.564)
Treat⁎ Post −0.053 0.132 −0.159⁎⁎ −0.133⁎ −0.391⁎⁎⁎ 0.000
(−0.987) (1.226) (−2.273) (−1.785) (−2.639) (0.001)
CG and firm-level controls
Top1 0.723⁎⁎⁎ 0.748⁎ 0.429 −0.387 −0.609 −0.152
(3.220) (1.831) (1.587) (−1.249) (−1.121) (−0.343)
Mngshr −1.687⁎⁎ −1.738 −1.993⁎⁎⁎ −2.798⁎ 3.755 −3.275⁎⁎
(−2.493) (−0.792) (−3.198) (−1.908) (0.954) (−2.390)
Board size −0.232⁎ −0.457⁎⁎ −0.132 −0.030 −0.475 0.196
(−1.778) (−2.108) (−0.707) (−0.164) (−1.430) (0.709)
Indep Dir −0.853⁎ −0.907 −1.023⁎ −0.446 −2.159 0.919
(−1.755) (−1.231) (−1.681) (−0.617) (−1.565) (0.917)
Firm size −0.032 0.051 −0.064⁎ −0.175⁎⁎⁎ −0.168⁎⁎ −0.167⁎⁎⁎
(−0.937) (0.858) (−1.762) (−4.119) (−2.361) (−3.338)
Tangibles 0.354⁎⁎ 0.359 0.290⁎ −0.372 −0.491 −0.312
(1.994) (0.959) (1.680) (−1.600) (−1.202) (−1.140)
Leverage 0.384⁎⁎ 0.506⁎ 0.405⁎⁎ 0.670⁎⁎⁎ 1.055⁎⁎⁎ 0.526⁎⁎
(2.220) (1.682) (2.282) (3.268) (3.102) (2.270)
Sales growth −0.072⁎ −0.091 −0.054 −0.083 0.049 −0.190⁎⁎
(−1.671) (−1.001) (−1.195) (−1.306) (0.493) (−2.497)
No. of obs. 1025 383 642 1025 383 642
Adj. R-square 0.228 0.290 0.200 0.348 0.462 0.293
This table presents the PSM-DID regression results for the principal-principal conflict of interests, as captured by Related-party transactions, i.e. the
sum of related sales divided by operating revenues and related purchases divided by operating expenses in Panel A, and Labor redundancy, i.e. the
difference between actual number of employees and the estimated number of employees in Panel B. For each variable, we first report the results for
the full sample of 105 treated firms in columns 1 and 4. Then, we separately report results for the two subsamples according to the source of MLS
entry. If the reduction in government ownership (Top1) is larger than 5% of outstanding shares after the entry of a large non-state investor, we
identify it as a significant reduction, namely R_Top1; otherwise, we treat it as an insignificant reduction in Top1, namely NR_Top1. The results for the
R_Top1 subsample are reported in columns 2 and 5, while the results for the NR_Top1 subsample are reported in columns 3 and 6. Treat is a dummy
variable that equals one for the treated firms that experience a change in ownership structure from a single to multiple large shareholders and equals
zero for the non-treated benchmark firms. Post is a dummy variable that equals one in all years as of MLS entry and zero in the years before.
Regression models always include industry and year fixed effects, with standard errors clustered at the firm level. All other test and control variables
are defined in Table 1.
Note: Significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 level is denoted by ⁎, ⁎⁎, and ⁎⁎⁎, respectively.
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5.3. The effects of MLS entry on the stock market valuation of listed SOEs
We now empirically investigate the effects of MLS on the stock market valuation of Chinese listed SOEs. Table 8, Panels A and B
show the panel data and PSM-DID results when using Tobin's Q as the dependent variable. Overall, the relation between MLS entry
and Tobin's Q is highly significant and positive in the R_Top1 subsample. This finding therefore provides strong empirical support for
Hypothesis 4a, advancing that MLS entry has a positive effect on the stock market valuation of state-controlled listed firms. Yet, as this
finding only arises for the R_Top1 subsample, it might indicate that stock market investors worry most about labor redundancy in
Chinese listed SOEs, which is an idea that we will further explore hereafter.
To examine the conjecture that the earlier-identified value increase engendered by MLS entry (in Table 8) stems at least in part
from the restraining effect that MLS have on PA and PP conflicts of interests, we now investigate the relation between our various
proxies for agency problems and firm value. To that end, we relate the change in Tobin's Q from the year before to the year after MLS
Table 8
Panel data regression model & PSM-DID regression model: Tobin's Q.
Panel A:panel data regression Panel B: PSM-DID regression
Treated R_Top1 NR_Top1 PSM sample R_Top1 NR_Top1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 18.518⁎⁎⁎ 22.666⁎⁎⁎ 16.888⁎⁎⁎ 15.224⁎⁎⁎ 19.256⁎⁎⁎ 14.002⁎⁎⁎
(6.869) (5.905) (4.691) (7.476) (6.307) (5.241)
The entry of MLS
Change 0.161 0.766⁎⁎ −0.072
(0.813) (2.381) (−0.335)
Treat 0.180 0.029 0.247
(1.477) (0.159) (1.383)
Post −0.146 −0.235 −0.045
(−1.304) (−1.405) (−0.291)
Treat⁎Post 0.328⁎⁎ 0.689⁎⁎⁎ 0.051
(2.311) (2.743) (0.277)
CG and firm-level controls
Top1 −0.157 2.335 −0.628 −0.323 −0.148 −0.283
(−0.183) (1.648) (−0.511) (−0.638) (−0.225) (−0.387)
Mngshr −2.755 4.908 −2.280 0.861 6.085 −0.170
(−0.550) (0.919) (−0.424) (0.265) (1.110) (−0.045)
Board size 0.085 0.219 0.204 0.308 −0.094 0.541
(0.136) (0.288) (0.243) (0.634) (−0.241) (0.650)
Indep Dir 0.591 2.121 −0.510 1.500 3.295⁎ 0.496
(0.490) (1.059) (−0.269) (1.327) (1.733) (0.325)
Firm size −0.792⁎⁎⁎ −0.987⁎⁎⁎ −0.674⁎⁎⁎ −0.675⁎⁎⁎ −0.708⁎⁎⁎ −0.610⁎⁎⁎
(−5.745) (−6.022) (−4.235) (−5.864) (−3.913) (−5.045)
Tangibles −0.808⁎ −1.281⁎⁎ −1.119⁎ −0.283 −0.599 −0.518
(−1.871) (−2.060) (−1.928) (−0.711) (−0.950) (−1.000)
Leverage −0.271 1.582⁎ −1.323⁎⁎⁎ −0.523 1.193 −1.648⁎⁎⁎
(−0.446) (1.802) (−2.793) (−0.991) (1.467) (−3.718)
Sales growth 0.305⁎ −0.002 0.688⁎⁎⁎ 0.176⁎ 0.103 0.351⁎⁎
(1.926) (−0.015) (2.850) (1.762) (0.956) (2.141)
Nontradable 0.072 −0.222 −0.278 −0.204 −0.106 −0.356
(0.184) (−0.415) (−0.574) (−0.584) (−0.172) (−0.764)
Inverse Mills ratio −0.416 −0.793⁎ −0.345
(−1.622) (−1.824) (−1.331)
No. of obs. 970 394 576 1025 383 642
Adj. R-square 0.476 0.556 0.491 0.470 0.528 0.490
This table presents the multivariate regression results for Tobin's Q, i.e. the market value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus the book
value of equity, scaled by the book value of total assets. We report the results from the panel data model and the PSM-DID model in Panels A and B,
respectively. In each panel, we first report the results for the full sample (columns 1 and 4). Then, we separately report the results for the two
subsamples according to the source of MLS entry. If the reduction in government ownership (Top1) is larger than 5% of outstanding shares after the
entry of a large non-state investor, we identify it as a significant reduction, namely R_Top1; otherwise, we treat it as an insignificant reduction in
Top1, namely NR_Top1. The results for the R_Top1 subsample are reported in columns 2 and 5, while the results for the NR_Top1 subsample are
reported in columns 3 and 6. Change is a dummy variable that equals one for the treated firms in all years as of MLS entry and zero in the years
before MLS entry. Treat is a dummy variable that equals one for the treated firms that experience a change in ownership structure from a single to
multiple large shareholders and equals zero for the non-treated benchmark firms. Post is a dummy variable that equals one in all years as of MLS
entry and zero in the years before. Regression models always include industry and year fixed effects, with standard errors clustered at the firm level.
The panel data models also include Heckman's inverse Mills ratio to control for potential self-selection bias. All other test and control variables are
defined in Table 1.
Note: Significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 level is denoted by ⁎, ⁎⁎, and ⁎⁎⁎, respectively.
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entry to the change in our four agency proxies, i.e. Excess perk, PPS, RPT, and LR, all measured over this same window. Table 9,
column 4 reveals that only the change in LR is significantly negatively associated with the change in Tobin's Q, which provides
empirical support for Hypothesis 4b. Arguably, this finding also suggests that the more optimistic opinion about corporate value
developed by stock market investors after the entry of a large non-state investor in the listed SOE's ownership (as shown in Table 8)
can be directly related to the expected mitigation in excess personnel after MLS entry. Overall, this finding is in line with the results in
Table 8, while it also refines those results.
5.4. Placebo test
To further assess the parallel trend assumption underlying our DID model, we now develop a placebo test with a pseudo-event
year. For that purpose, we set the pseudo-event year at two years before the actual year of MLS entry and reduce the window of
analysis to one year before and one year after MLS entry. For example, for a firm with MLS entry in 2010, we assume that 2008 is the
pseudo-event year, which makes the pseudo pre-event period starting in 2007 and the pseudo post-event period starting in 2009. We
next redefine Post as a dummy variable that equals one in the pseudo post-event period and zero in the pseudo pre-event period. In
the absence of MLS entry, we expect a non-significant difference for the average change in the economic output variables between the
treated firms and the non-treated benchmark firms. Table 10 reports the regression results after re-estimating the earlier models
reported on in Tables 5, 7 and 8 (Panel B). Using the PSM-DID model, we find that our variable of interest, Post*Treat, now becomes
insignificant for explaining the various dependent variables. This outcome provides empirical support for the parallel trend as-
sumption, indicating that in the absence of MLS entry, our treated and non-treated benchmark firms would exhibit a similar trend in
their agency variables and market-to-book ratio. This outcome thus also indicates that it is the actual entry of a large non-state
investor that generates the earlier-detected positive corporate governance effects; it is that entry that also positively influences the
listed SOEs' stock market valuation.
5.5. Robustness checks
As a first (non-reported) extra test, we use the ratio of the managerial perk-related items to sales as an alternative to investigate
the CG effects of MLS entry on the PA conflict, which produces similar results as when using Excess perk. Next, we rely on ROA,
defined as the ratio of net income to total assets, to replace the ratio of EBITDA to total assets in the earlier Eq. (2). When using this
other measurement of PPS, we still find a significant positive effect of MLS entry on the pay-for-performance sensitivity of managerial
compensation, with this effect again being driven by the NR_Top1 subsample.
To alternatively capture the potential tunneling behavior by the listed SOE's controlling shareholder, we now split the overall RPT
variable into the ratio of related sales to operating revenues and the ratio of related purchases to operating expenses. The results using
these two other variables are in line with those reported in Tables 6 and 7. In other words, the entry of a large non-state investor has a
significant curbing effect on the dominant owner's tunneling behavior, yet this effect emerges only when the private investor sources
shares in the stock market. When using Overinvestment, i.e. the amount of investment expenditures beyond what is required to
maintain existing assets and to finance anticipated investments in positive-NPV projects (using the model of Richardson (2006)), to
replace LR as a measure for the costs of political control, we find highly robust results under the panel data model. In contrast, the
results from the PSM-DID model are in general not statistically significant.
To account for potential price difference between the tradable and non-tradable shares, we compute Tobin's Q in alternative ways.
First, as Chen and Xiong (2002) document that non-tradable state-owned and legal-person shares suffer from an illiquidity discount
Table 9
Panel data regression model: change in Tobin's Q.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept −0.366 −0.307 −0.287 −0.019
(−0.675) (−0.498) (−0.442) (−0.032)
Excess perk −49.309
(−0.942)
Pay-for-performance sensitivity −0.013
(−0.340)
Related-party transaction 0.305
(0.760)
Labor redundancy −0.457⁎
(−1.813)
No. of obs. 91 91 91 91
Adj. R-square 0.217 0.173 0.182 0.207
This table presents the multivariate regression results for the change in Tobin's Q, i.e. the market value of equity plus the book value of total assets
minus the book value of equity, scaled by the book value of total assets. The change in Tobin's Q is measured between year −1 and year +1 (with
year 0 being the year of MLS entry); the PA and PP proxies, which are defined in Table 1, are now also measured as changes over this same time
interval. Regression models always include industry and year fixed effects, with standard errors clustered at the firm level.
Note: Significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 level is denoted by ⁎, ⁎⁎, and ⁎⁎⁎, respectively.
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between 70% and 80%, we calculate Tobin's Q_70 by assuming a 70% discount on the listed SOE's non-tradable shares. Likewise, we
compute Tobin's Q_80 by relying on an 80% discount. Next, as Wu et al. (2012) argue that non-tradable shares are commonly
transferred at a price benchmarked against their book value, we construct Tobin's Q_BNT by using the book value of the non-tradable
shares. In line with our earlier findings in Table 8, MLS entry always significantly increases the market-to-book ratio of the firms in
the R_Top1 subsample. Moreover, and in line with the results in Table 9, the change in the firm's stock market valuation from before
to after MLS entry is only significantly negatively associated with the change in LR over that same window.
Instead of modelling the CG effects of MLS entry by means of a dummy variable, we next rely on a continuous variable, i.e.
Change_rate in the panel data models. This variable thus captures the fraction of shares bought by the large non-state investor at the
moment of MLS entry. Change_rate has an average value of 13.0% (median of 11.1%). In addition, we compute the fraction of shares
held by this second largest non-state investor relative to the fraction of shares controlled by the firm's dominant owner, i.e. Rate_Top1.
The latter variable thus captures the relative power of the non-state block holder after MLS entry. The models using Change_rate and
Rate_Top1 produce similar findings, yet have a somewhat smaller explanatory power than the models relying on Change.
Finally, we re-run our PSM-DID regression model after deleting the variable Post. Our results for the interaction term Post*Treat
prove highly robust. Next, in our PSM-DID model, we remove the year of actual MLS entry from the post-event period and still follow
the listed SOEs during a three-year window after MLS entry. The results show that our main conclusions as to the effects of MLS entry
on agency problems and the firm's stock market valuation still prevail. Similarly, we re-examine the results from the panel data
regression model after restricting the sample to the three years before and the three years after MLS entry. All previous findings prove
robust, except that the effect of MLS entry on PPS now becomes insignificant (p-value of 0.116).
6. Discussion and conclusions
This paper uses a panel data model and a difference-in-difference model to investigate the effects of MLS entry on the various
types of agency problems in Chinese listed SOEs. For this purpose, we rely on a large sample of state-controlled listed firms over the
period 2006–2017. In China, listed SOEs indeed exhibit a mixture of agency problems: the conflict of interests between managers and
shareholders and the conflict of interests between the state, as dominant owner, and the firm's minority investors in the stock market.
Those salient features of listed SOEs motivated us to examine whether the entry of a large non-state investor can play a beneficial
governance role and reduce the various agency problems in those listed SOEs. Moreover, when implementing our tests, we took the
source of MLS entry into account, by distinguishing between the new non-state block holder accumulating shares in case the gov-
ernment divests its stake vs. just sourcing shares in the stock market. Our results reveal that the entry of a large non-state investor
alleviates both PA and PP conflicts of interests, including the costs of political control. Moreover, and except for the restraining effect
on labor redundancy, those effects only arise when the large non-state block holder sources shares in the secondary market. In
contrast, the significant reduction in labor redundancy only emerges when the government was willing to give up part of its control
over the listed SOE. Interestingly, we find that MLS entry also enhances the stock market valuation of those listed SOEs. Yet, this
effect appears to be driven by the firms in which the government reduced its equity stake and the listed firm subsequently diminished
its excess personnel.
The findings in our article shed some important light on the governance role of MLS. We find that compared with an ownership
structure with a single large shareholder, the entry of a heterogeneous, i.e. non-state block holder engenders highly beneficial effects
Table 10
Placebo test.
Excess perk consumption Pay-for-performance sensitivity Related-party transactions Labor redundancy Tobin's Q
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treat 0.456 0.000 0.059 0.177⁎ 0.022
(1.185) (0.267) (0.666) (1.733) (0.166)
Post 0.535 −0.002 −0.061 0.014 0.107
(1.435) (−1.513) (−0.779) (0.163) (0.776)
Treat⁎Post −0.090 0.002 −0.044 −0.065 0.151
(−0.175) (1.438) (−0.499) (−0.648) (1.011)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of obs. 312 312 312 312 312
Adj. R-square 0.009 0.055 0.133 0.371 0.493
This table presents the results from a placebo test for the effects of MLS entry on PA and PP conflicts of interests as well as the listed SOEs' stock
market valuation. Specifically, we report the results from a PSM-DID model, in which the pseudo-event year is now assumed to occur two years
before actual MLS entry and the window is now reduced to one year before and one year after MLS entry. For example, for a firm with MLS entry in
2010, we consider 2008 as the pseudo-event year, making the pseudo pre-event period starting in 2007 and the pseudo post-event period starting in
2009. Treat is a dummy variable that equals one for the treated firms that experience a change in ownership structure from a single to multiple large
shareholders and equals zero for the non-treated benchmark firms. Post is a dummy variable that equals one in all years as of MLS entry and zero in
the years before. Regression models always include industry and year fixed effects, with standard errors clustered at the firm level. All other test and
control variables are defined in Table 1.
Note: Significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 level is denoted by ⁎, ⁎⁎, and ⁎⁎⁎, respectively.
F. Chen, et al. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 57 (2019) 101203
18
for Chinese listed SOEs, by alleviating their agency problems. Interestingly, those block holders prove able to also curtail the
principal-agent conflict of interests, a result that has not been documented before. Moreover, they prove able to restrain not only the
traditional tunneling practices by the firm's dominant owner, but also the more complex costs of political control in those listed SOEs.
Indeed, MLS prove able to mitigate the agency problem arising from the government pursuing social or political goals, which harms
the firm's stock market investors. While the latter agency costs apply uniquely to listed SOEs, our other findings may not necessarily
matter only for state-controlled listed firms. As an example, family-controlled listed firms often face a similar problem of inadequate
managerial monitoring, in particular when family members act as managers in those listed firms. Then, the entry of another large
(non-family) shareholder could be associated with a reduction in the PA problem, too. Another research avenue for non-state-
controlled listed firms is to also explore the relation between the source of MLS entry and PA/PP problems. For non-SOEs, the
corporate governance effects of MLS entry could indeed also depend on whether the new investor buys shares from the firm's
dominant owner vs. accumulates shares via transactions in the secondary market. Probably, the odds of collusion among large
shareholders are higher when those shares are transferred in a negotiated deal among them.
Finally, for policy makers, our findings suggest that one way to solve the inefficiency problem in state-controlled listed firms is to
allow for the entry of a non-state entity as block holder. The results in our article therefore also have some implications for the
concurrent ownership reform in China, known as the 2015 mixed ownership reform. Through this reform, the Chinese government
encourages SOEs to introduce different types of stock ownership, in order to improve those firms' economic vitality. By its very
nature, this reform can be considered as a process to change the ownership structure of (listed) SOEs to include multiple large
shareholders. However, to achieve its desired outcomes, the findings in our study suggest that it is not always necessary for the
government to divest its own shares. Finally, the results in our paper point out that the government should be aware that not all of the
beneficial effects from MLS entry may be incorporated into the stock price of those listed firms.
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Appendix A
Panel A: Probit regression used to compute the propensity scores
Pre-match Post-match
Intercept 0.293 0.634
(0.43) (0.66)
Top1 −1.179⁎⁎⁎ −0.591
(−4.73) (−1.63)
Prof −1.001 −0.003
(−1.35) (−0.00)
Firm size −0.097⁎⁎⁎ −0.109⁎⁎
(−3.12) (−2.44)
Tangibles 0.203 0.174
(0.91) (0.62)
Leverage 1.020⁎⁎⁎ 0.899⁎⁎⁎
(4.78) (2.94)
Sales growth 0.150⁎ 0.204
(1.65) (1.59)
No. of obs. 4306 985
pseudo R-square 0.076 0.050
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Panel B: Test of the effectiveness of the PSM technique
Variable Mean value for treated firms Mean value for benchmark firms Mean difference
(Treated-Benchmark)
Top1 Pre-match 0.327 0.439 −0.112⁎⁎⁎
Post-match 0.327 0.391 −0.064⁎⁎⁎
Prof Pre-match 0.045 0.049 −0.005⁎
Post-match 0.045 0.043 0.003
Firm size Pre-match 22.155 22.231 −0.075
Post-match 22.155 22.276 −0.121
Tangibles Pre-match 0.268 0.272 −0.004
Post-match 0.268 0.256 0.012
Leverage Pre-match 0.547 0.520 0.027⁎⁎⁎
Post-match 0.547 0.558 −0.011
Sales growth Pre-match 0.163 0.166 −0.003
Post-match 0.163 0.153 0.010
This table presents the results from the procedure to identify the propensity-score-matched (PSM) benchmark
firms. This PSM approach involves pairing treated firm and non-treated firms based on similar observable firm
characteristics. We implement this procedure by first running a probit regression model to estimate the prob-
ability of being a treated firm using the data in year t-1, i.e. the year before MLS entry. Next, we match each
treated firm with the non-treated firms in the same year and industry using the nearest neighbor matching
technique without replacement. In Panel A, the first column reports the estimation results of the probit regression
model. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one for a treated firm and zero for a non-treated
firm. Prof is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. All the other variables are defined in
Table 1. In Panel B, we compare the distribution of the control variables used to estimate the propensity scores.
Regression models always include industry and year fixed effects, with standard errors clustered at the firm level.
Note: Significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 level is denoted by ⁎, ⁎⁎, and ⁎⁎⁎, respectively.
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